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ABSTRACT
TLS 1.3 marks a significant departure from previous
versions of the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS).
The new version offers a simplified protocol flow, more
secure cryptographic primitives, and new features to
improve performance, among other things. In this pa-
per, we conduct the first study of TLS 1.3 deployment
and use since its standardization by the IETF. We use
active scans to measure deployment across more than
275M domains, including nearly 90M country-code top-
level domains. We establish and investigate the critical
contribution that hosting services and CDNs make to
the fast, initial uptake of the protocol. We use passive
monitoring at two positions on the globe to determine
the degree to which users profit from the new protocol
and establish the usage of its new features. Finally, we
exploit data from a widely deployed measurement app
in the Android ecosystem to analyze the use of TLS 1.3
in mobile networks and in mobile browsers. Our study
shows that TLS 1.3 enjoys enormous support even in its
early days, unprecedented for any TLS version. However,
this is strongly related to very few global players pushing
it into the market and sustaining its growth.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Transport Layer Protocol (TLS) is the backbone
of secure communication over the Internet. It is used
to secure HTTP and, by extension, protocols operat-
ing on top of HTTP. Applications running on servers,
desktop devices, and mobile phones all rely on it. Over
the years the security of TLS has come under increasing
scrutiny and a long list of vulnerabilities and flaws have
been addressed in the last decade [40]. TLS 1.3, the
newest version of the protocol, redesigns central aspects,
simplifying the protocol, especially the handshake, and
streamlining encryption to address many of these issues.
It also supports a higher degree of privacy by encrypt-
ing as early as possible and improves performance by
shortening the handshake.
Development of TLS 1.3 has been driven by major
Internet corporations and organizations, in particular
Google, Facebook, and Mozilla, who felt a need to ad-
dress the security needs of their users and make their
Web businesses faster to access across all devices. This
drive is in line with previous contributions to TLS like
Certificate Transparency, the HSTS header for HTTP,
and the downgrade protection SCSV. Previous work
has found evidence that the control that corporations
like Google and Facebook exercise—they control both
endpoints of a connection—leads to new security mecha-
nisms being deployed faster [8].
In this paper, we analyze both the use and deployment
of TLS 1.3 employing three different data sources: data
from large-scale Internet scans, passive traffic observation
in the Northern and Southern hemisphere, and data
raised by a widely deployed application for the Android
OS that can analyze TLS handshakes. Our primary
contributions are as follows:
Deployment across DNS zones We carry out large-
scale scans of domains across a large number of DNS
zones, including com/net/org, 54 country-code top-level
domains (ccTLDs), and more than 1100 of the new
generic TLDs allocated by ICANN. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time that TLS deployment
is analyzed with respect to the latter two categories.
We show that deployment varies significantly across the
groups of domains we analyze.
Observation of TLS 1.3 use Our passive monitoring
allows us to identify the properties of TLS 1.3 traffic in
more detail, including use of the performance-enhancing
improvements. We show the high degree of centraliza-
tion that this protocol represents as most connections
terminate at hosts belonging to very few entities.
Impact of hosting We enrich our data from both active
and passive measurement with DNS lookups and cor-
relation with IP ranges of large cloud providers known
to host a significant amount of domains. We show that
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the domain front-end service Cloudflare is dominant in
the case of deployed TLS 1.3; however, in TLS 1.3 use
we find Facebook and Google to be responsible for a
majority of connections.
The Android ecosystem Finally, we use data from the
Lumen privacy-enhancement app to investigate under
which circumstances mobile devices make use of TLS 1.3.
We discover that large corporations have experimented
with various, different versions of TLS 1.3, which are
sometimes still in use but not identical to the standard-
ized version.
2 BACKGROUND
TLS 1.3 was standardized by the IETF in August 2018 [53].
It presents a departure from previous versions of the
protocol in order to avoid inheriting the flaws and vul-
nerabilities present in older versions [4, 7, 12, 40, 45].
TLS 1.3 brings two main advantages: enhanced security
and improved speed. The former is achieved thanks to a
new protocol flow and modern cryptographic algorithms,
including mandated Perfect Forward Secrecy and allow-
ing only symmetric ciphers that provide authenticated
encryption (AEAD ciphers). The speed also improves
due to changes in the handshake that reduce the number
of necessary round-trips. Encrypted payloads are now
commonly sent after just one round-trip (1-RTT). In
some cases where a past cryptographic key can be re-
used, data can be sent in the first TCP packet (0-RTT
mode) [47]. TLS 1.3 also improves user privacy and en-
crypts the payload as early as possible. This includes
the server certificate and many extensions (especially on
the server side) which were sent in the clear in the past.
As opposed to previous TLS versions, stakeholders
began supporting and experimenting with TLS 1.3 vari-
ants very early, long before the standardization by the
IETF had finished. This early adoption was driven by
big actors like Mozilla, Cloudflare, Google, and—at lower
intensity—Facebook. Cloudflare became the first cloud
and CDN provider enabling TLS 1.3 for its customers as
early as September 2016 [46]. Between December 2017
and May 2018, the percentage of TLS 1.3 connections
served by Cloudflare grew from 0.06% to 5-6% [32]. Face-
book has deployed TLS 1.3 support globally in their apps
and clients (including WhatsApp and Instagram) and
in their user-facing and internal infrastructure. They re-
port more than 50% of their global Internet traffic being
TLS 1.3 as of August 2018 [29]. Other actors have not
yet made clear announcements: Akamai, for instance, an-
nounced support for TLS 1.3 to start in mid-2018 [5], but
to our knowledge has not yet enabled TLS 1.3 support.
Many end-user clients are already TLS 1.3-enabled.
Mozilla’s Firefox and Google’s Chrome were the first
browsers to support TLS 1.3 in March 2017 (Firefox v52)
and December 2017 (Chrome v56), respectively. Both
initiated support in February 2017 with a beta roll-out
for a fraction of their customers. Due to incompatibilities
with popular middleboxes such as BlueCoat proxies [21],
discovered in this unprecedented trial program, they
deprecated support for a time until this was resolved.
3 RELATED WORK
Many academic studies have characterized and studied
different aspects of the TLS and X.509 PKI ecosystem, in-
cluding the general state of the ecosystem and certificate
validation [6, 10, 20, 28, 36], certificate revocation [8,
61, 62], vulnerability discovery [4, 7, 12, 45], Certifi-
cate Transparency [19, 33, 55, 57, 60], and TLS/HTTPS
support [35, 56]. In the case of TLS 1.3 many studies
examined the protocol and proposed improvements and
new features [13, 18, 24, 41], cryptographic schemes [14],
performed protocol verification and cryptographic anal-
ysis [16, 17, 26, 39] (including symbolic analysis [22]) to
discover vulnerabilities and flaws [37].
More closely related to our work, only a limited num-
ber of previous studies measure TLS 1.3 deployment
and support. However, none of these papers focus on
performing a comprehensive analysis of TLS 1.3. Instead,
they gain anecdotal insights about ongoing deployment
efforts of TLS 1.3 as a by-product of their attempts
to answer more general research questions about TLS
deployment in the wild. Kotzias et al. [40] perform a
longitudinal analysis of TLS deployment for five years. In
their work, the authors focus on changes in TLS deploy-
ment caused by the disclosure of protocol vulnerabilities.
The authors also briefly report on TLS 1.3 deployment
in April 2018 (23% of client connections supporting it
while it being used in ≈ 1% of connections). TLS 1.3
was not the focus of their study. Note that Kotzias et
al. also use data from the ICSI SSL Notary for their
analysis. A 2017 study analyzing Lumen data (which
we also use in our paper) reported marginal support of
TLS 1.3 extensions [49]. This early support was driven
mainly by Android software developed by large compa-
nies like Facebook. Finally, a number of studies have
focused on QUIC –an UDP-based protocol that has been
proposed as a lightweight and low-latency alternative to
TLS-based protocols [23, 38, 42, 44, 54].
4 DATASETS AND METHODOLOGY
In the following, we describe our data collection from
three sources. We choose our data sources to cover as
2
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many angles of the burgeoning TLS 1.3 ecosystem as
possible. Our primary data sources are active scans to
capture deployment, passive monitoring to understand
actual use in practice, and analysis of mobile phone
traffic on the device to understand the difference to the
mobile world. We enrich our data sets with lookups of IP
ranges of important cloud providers and DNS scans to
obtain nameserver records. We use these to determine the
importance of big stakeholders for both deployment and
use of TLS 1.3. Please note that we discuss the ethical
considerations of our data collections in Appendix A.
4.1 Active scanning
We perform active scans of Internet domains to measure
the deployment of TLS 1.3. We reuse and extend a
method previously published in [9]. Our scanning is
performed from a large research university in Australia.
Obtaining domain lists On 1 May 2019, we collect a large
number of domain names from publicly available sources.
Our input sets are zone files plus three top lists, namely
the Alexa Top 1M list, the Majestic list, and Cisco’s
Umbrella list. Scheitle et al. analyzed the composition
of top lists in [58]; our choice of the Alexa list and
com/net/org is based on their recommendations for lists
with mostly functional Web sites and lists representing a
general population. We obtain the zone files for com and
org directly from the operators, and net from ICANN’s
Centralized Zone Data Service, together with 1120 zone
files of the new generic TLDs (gTLDs hereafter). From
ViewDNS1, we acquire domain lists for 54 country-code
TLDs (ccTLDs). ViewDNS claims to base these on Web
crawls, updating them at least every few months. We
accept the bias towards Web domains and verify that
we have a sufficiently high number of domains in each
ccTLD. Only 9 ccTLDs have fewer than 100k domains,
but none has less than 19k. For 22 ccTLDs , we have
more than 500k domains, and for 12 ccTLDs more than
1M domains (including fr , ru, cn, eu, nl, and de). We
lament the absence of uk.
We combine our input lists into three domain lists
of increasing size, each for one scanning campaign: one
for the Alexa domains, one for the ccTLDs, and one
for all other domains. In the post-processing stage, we
subdivide the results for the latter into com/net/org and
the new gTLDs. Table 1 shows the number of domains
in each input set. As some names in the top lists include
subdomains and not just the registrable name under the
TLD (e.g., sub2.sub1.example.com.au), we use Mozilla’s
public suffix list to derive the registrable domain name
(example.com.au) and add it our input list.
1https://viewdns.info
Table 1: Domain lists in each scanning campaign.
Input data set # Domains Campaign dates
Alexa 1.0M 1 May 2019
ccTLDs 87.93M 4-5 May 2019
com/net/org 163.97M 1-3 May 2019
gTLDs 23.43M
Resolving domains, port scanningWe resolve all domains
to A records using Scheitle’s fork of the massdns tool2.
We resolve CNAMEs up to 15 levels of indirection. We
then run zmap [28] to identify all IP addresses with open
port TCP/443.
TLS scans We rebase and modify goscanner, the TLS
scanner by the authors of [9], to carry out a TLS hand-
shake for every domain hosted on such an IP address,
enabling support for TLS 1.3 and sending this protocol
version as first preference. We create a full PCAP of all
scans using tcpdump. We also use Zeek (formerly Bro)
to parse the PCAP files. This enables us to investigate
failed handshakes in more depth than previous work.
Basing our scans on domain names rather than IP ad-
dresses allows us to support the Server Name Extension
of TLS, i.e., HTTP virtual hosts. It also allows us to
identify differences between domains in different groups
(e.g., gTLDs vs ccTLD vs Alexa) and identify countries
with particularly high deployment. Furthermore, it en-
ables identification of differences per domain, e.g., when
a domain configures TLS 1.3 on one IP address, but not
on others.
Limitations Our active scans do not investigate TLS
deployment on IPv6: our hosting institution in Australia
does not yet offer general IPv6 connectivity. We also do
not check support for many of the new extensions that
TLS 1.3 defines, e.g., Certificate Authorities or Post-
Handshake Client Authentication, leaving this to future
work.
4.2 Passive observations
Our passive data collection uses two data sources. (i) We
have access to data from the ICSI SSL Notary [11],
a large-scale observation effort of TLS that began in
2012, monitoring at sites mostly located in Northern
America. (ii) To enrich our analysis with additional
data, we also collect data from the campus of a large
Australian research university with more than 50,000
students. Both the ICSI Notary as well as our Australian
data collection efforts use the Zeek Network Security
2https://github.com/quirins/massdns
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Monitor [2] (until recently known as Bro) to collect their
data.
Since its inception in February 2012, the Notary has
observed more than 400 billion TLS connections; a num-
ber of institutions has contributed, typically 5–8 different
sites contribute data simultaneously. The data collected
has been expanded over the years, as the TLS protocol
changed. It is, however, difficult to quickly adapt this
data collection effort for new protocol features. There
are several reasons. This data collection is run in opera-
tional environments using Zeek to secure their networks.
The collection effort is hence a best-effort service by the
operators and can only use the data that is provided
by the current Zeek version used on-site. It is thus not
possible to quickly collect data on new features or to
change the data collection to answer emerging research
questions. Furthermore, expanding the data that the
Notary collects typically needs the data collection to be
re-approved.
Thus, we amend our data collection effort by collect-
ing four full days worth of data (2019-05-09 16:00 till
midnight 2019-05-13, local time) at a large research uni-
versity in Australia. This data collection effort is directly
under our control and collects additional information
from the handshake, like the presence of TLS 1.3 Hello
Retry requests (see Section 5.2.4). Furthermore, we use
it for a geographic comparison of the TLS 1.3 traffic.
During the 4 days of data collection, we saw 379.7M
TLS connections. Note that while the Notary dataset
contains IPv4 and v6 traffic, the Australian University
does not yet support IPv6; we thus do not encounter
IPv6 traffic in this measurement.
Limitations We note that for the ICSI Notary, the
dataset exhibits artefacts of the collection process that
are beyond our control. As the Notary leverages op-
erational setups that run the analysis on top of their
normal duties, one must accept occasional outages, pack-
ets drops (e.g., due to CPU overload) and occasional
misconfigurations. As such, the Notary data collection
effort is designed as a “best effort” process: it aims at
as much coverage as possible, but we can usually not
quantify what it misses. Given the large total volume
across our sites, however, we consider the aggregate as
representative of many properties of real-world TLS ac-
tivity.
While the Notary collected data from outside North
America in the past, currently all contributing sites are
inside of North America. Furthermore, only one large
University Campus (with more than 30,000 students) is
currently contributing the full set of TLS 1.3 data items
the Notary can collect. Some of the Notary analysis
thus only uses data from this single site—we make this
explicit by referring to the site as 𝑁1 when this is the
case.
4.3 Lumen
The Lumen Privacy Monitor [49] is a privacy-enhancing
tool for Android, available on Google Play [50]. Lumen
intercepts and analyzes mobile traffic in user space (and
on localhost) to help users stay on top of their mobile
traffic and privacy by reporting network flows and per-
sonal data dissemination and allowing them to block
undesired traffic. Making Lumen available to the public
as a privacy-enhancing solution allowed the project to
recruit users from all over the world, and as a result to
collect a large amount of anonymized real-world traffic
data generated by real user stimuli.
Mobile traffic interception in user-space Lumen acts as
middleware between apps and the network interface: it
leverages the Android VPN permission and implements
a complete but simplified network stack to capture and
analyze network traffic locally without requiring root
permissions. Lumen collects and inspects mobile traffic
transparently, regardless of the transport and application-
layer protocol used by a mobile application without
modifying the network path. Lumen is able to correlate
traffic flows with app identifiers and process IDs: it can
accurately match TLS flows to the process that generated
them.
Dataset Between November 2015 and April 2019, more
than 22,000 users from over 100 countries installed Lu-
men from Google Play. Lumen’s dataset contains accu-
rate yet anonymized traffic fingerprints for more than
92,000 Android apps, excluding mobile browsers to pre-
serve users’ anonymity (see the ethical discussion in
Appendix A). For this paper, we analyze 11.8 million
TLS connections (Client and Server Hello records) from
56,221 apps connecting to 149,389 domains (identified
by the Server Name Indication field).
The > 92,000 apps in Lumen’s dataset include many
different types: apps downloaded from Google Play (2%
of the apps have more than 1M installations according
to Google Play’s metadata), pre-installed software [31],
and apps downloaded from alternative app stores (e.g.,
F-Droid). Furthermore, Lumen collects data from many
different OS versions.
4.4 Hosting and CDNs
As the development of TLS 1.3 is very much driven by
industry players offering different Web services, a key
element of our study is the impact that cloud and host-
ing providers have on the deployment of TLS 1.3. We
are not aware of a curated list containing the IP ranges
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of major providers and what they are used for. We use
the term ‘cloud hosting’ relatively imprecisely, acknowl-
edging that there are many different, often overlapping
forms—from securing front-ends (e.g., Cloudflare) and
‘classic’ provisioning of an entire Web presence (Square-
space, GoDaddy), to CDNs. In this paper, we group
these different providers together when they share one
property: they are in control of a public server TLS
endpoint intended for Web users, and hence they can
control which TLS version is used.
We searched for IPv4 and IPv6 blocks on the websites
of arguably the most common cloud providers. Cloud-
flare, Amazon AWS, and Microsoft Azure disclose the
IP allocations for their services. DigitalOcean, Google,
and Alibaba do not. We obtain their IP ranges via the
search interface of Hurricane Electric’s bgp.he.net. To
minimize the false positive rate, we manually exclude
IP blocks that, from the description, either belong to
cooperation partners like ISPs, are access networks (like
Google/Alphabet Fibre), or are intended for corporate
use or data caches and hence are unlikely to host a
front-end to a website.
Most, but not necessarily all domains in a given
provider range should be considered ‘hosted’. Similarly, a
provider’s IP complete ranges may not be found via the
mentioned search interface. Cloudflare’s primary busi-
ness models are DNS provisioning and acting as a more
secure front-end for Web services. A (non-Cloudflare)
domain with an IP address in Cloudflare’s range is very
likely set up to use Cloudflare’s Web front-end. A similar
argument holds for Squarespace as a dedicated web-
site creation platform: domains with IPs in this range
are very likely hosted. However, DigitalOcean, Ama-
zon AWS, Azure, and Alibaba Cloud all offer products
around ‘elastic’ computing, allowing customers to spin
up virtual machines from provided images. They offer
many other products as well, however. Their IP ranges
will almost certainly contain some domains belonging to
provider infrastructure, although their number should
be very small compared to the millions on our domain
lists. Google and GoDaddy are even more complex cases.
Both have hundreds of IP ranges registered but also own
many subsidiaries, whose ranges may not be listed under
the name of the parent company. The number of their
internal domain names should dwindle compared to the
size of our domain lists; however, we expect to miss out
on some hosted domains as we do not know the ranges
of the subsidiaries.
We also add further providers of a different kind. We
add the IP ranges for Akamai for comparison. Due to
Akamai’s strategy of intelligently mirroring customer
content, our hypothesis is that most of these IPs will not
serve as front-end servers for Web sites, but it is worth
validating this. We include a VPS provider from Europe,
OVH. The origin of the provider is not the ‘elastic’ model;
it classically attracts customers who want a high degree
of customization. Finally, we retrieve the allocated ranges
for Facebook. We use these to identify connections to
Facebook services in our passive monitoring.
In addition to IP ranges, we employ a second method
to identify hosting setups that do not use one of the
described providers. For every domain where a TLS
handshake in our active scan used TLS 1.3, we also
retrieve the nameserver (NS) record with massdns.
5 RESULTS
We present deployment findings using our active scans;
we then turn to use of TLS 1.3 using passive monitoring
and Lumen.
5.1 Deployment
5.1.1 Incomplete handshakes. Since ca. 2011, reports
such as [9, 27, 36] have consistently shown that servers
with open port TCP/443 often do not complete a TLS
handshake. Depending on the choice of scanning targets
(domains or Internet-wide scans), this can be around
27-33% of hosts. With domain data across many zones
available, we investigate this in more depth than the
mentioned previous publications. For Alexa domains,
the rate we determine is only 4%. For com/net/org, the
gTLDs, and the ccTLDs, it is 17-19%. The ccTLDs offer
a markedly different picture: we find a high failure rate
in some well-known TLDs like cn, de, eu (44%, 39%, 24%
respectively), the rate being between 5-15% for roughly
half the ccTLDs. Roughly a quarter of ccTLDs show a
failure rate between 1-5%— interestingly, we do not find
‘important’ ccTLDs in there, with the possible exceptions
of pl (Poland), au (Australia), and arg (Argentina). The
ccTLDs for which we have the fewest samples are part
of the middle group—we hence have no reason to believe
that ViewDNS’s collection process introduced a bias.
While in many cases the TLS connections are aborted
without any TLS protocol messages by the server, in
some cases the server sends a TLS alert before the con-
nection is established. For example, 6.8% of connections
to ccTLDs, and 1.8%, 2.9%, and 2.3% to com/net/org
domains abort connections with an unrecognized name
alert, signifying that the server does not accept the do-
main name that we send it. Manually contacting a small
subset of these servers yields the same result when no
SNI is sent. An internal error alert signifying a server
problem is also common, appearing in 1.2% of ccTLD
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connections and 1.8%, 2.2%, 2.3% of com/net/org do-
mains. The generic alert handshake error appears in
0.5%-1% of connections. Other alerts (like protocol ver-
sion or certificate error) are much less common, only
appearing in a few hundred connections.
Our findings are not conclusive but point at differ-
ent deployment strategies utilizing different hosting
providers in different countries. This is supported by
our later analysis of common hosters.
5.1.2 Deployment across DNS zones. We present our
findings across our chosen domain groups. Table 2 sum-
marizes TLS versions across servers in different DNS
zones and across the corresponding IP addresses. Note
that the percentages are given as percentages of resolv-
able domains.
We test for deployment differences within our largest
group, com/net/org, but find that the respective per-
centages are never more than 1-2% different between
the zones. As one would expect, Alexa domains almost
always offer an open HTTPS port, and roughly half of
the domains in our ccTLDs and com/net/org do so, too.
The new gTLDs lag behind—however, many of these
TLDs are known to be parked, or have been acquired
by large corporations to protect their DNS names, i.e.,
they are not intended for public, external access [34].
We say a domain supports TLS 1.3 if at least one
of its IP address supports this version. TLS 1.3 is best
supported on Alexa domains at 18.5%. Only ca. 5% of
com/net/org and ccTLDs support it. Interestingly, this
percentage is slightly higher for the new gTLDs. The
aforementioned, common use of gTLD domains could
be a reason, but also different hosting choices. Across
all zones, TLS 1.2 is much better supported, showing
that the roll-out of the new version is only picking up.
Support for TLS 1.1 and 1.0 has fallen to negligible levels.
Note that we do not scan SSL 3, which is reported by
our scanner as a failed handshake.
5.1.3 Inconsistent use of protocol. For Alexa domains,
we verify how often domains that support TLS 1.3 do not
configure it for all IP addresses. We find only 105 Alexa
domains where a different TLS version is configured on
an alternative IP, and in less than a handful of cases the
other protocol is TLS 1.0 and not TLS 1.2. This corre-
sponds to 0.01% of domains with successful handshakes.
Handshakes failing on the alternative IP address is more
common (356 domains). We also investigate ccTLDs and
the new gTLDs; we find the same percentage as for Alexa.
It is twice that high for com/net/org, but we conclude
that overall domains deploy TLS versions remarkably
consistently.
5.1.4 Server preferences for ciphers. TLS 1.3 defines just
five cipher suites. We offer the three supported by Go:
128-bit AES in GCM mode, ChaCha20 Poly1305, and
256-bit AES in GCM mode in this order. 128-bit AES is
used in the overwhelming amount of connections: 90%
for domains in the Alexa list, in com/net/org, and in
the new gTLDs with most of the remaining connections
using 256-bit AES. For ccTLDs 256-bit AES was more
popular (29.6%) and ChaCha20 got a bit more than 2%.
This could again point at different deployment strate-
gies. ChaCha20 is very unpopular despite being Google’s
choice for a secure stream cipher.
5.1.5 TLS 1.3 by ccTLD. We investigate the use of
TLS 1.3 in the ccTLDs. Table 3 shows deployment of
TLS 1.3 by ccTLD as a percentage of TLS connections.
The range is wide: at the top, we find TLDs with 75-
80% TLS1.3—they are cf and tk. The East European
countries Ukraine, Slovakia, and Poland follow—but at
much lower deployment (27-42%). On the next five ranks,
we find Denmark, but also popular TLDs like io and
me. At the bottom end, surprisingly, we find large Euro-
pean zones and economically strong countries: Germany,
France, and Japan.
We investigate the top 5 and bottom 5 ccTLDs more
closely. Both cf (Central African Republic) and tk (Toke-
lau) are well-known for allowing the creation of domain
names at no cost. The high numbers for these domains
are easy to explain. Domains in cf resolve to 56.7k dis-
tinct IP addresses. Of these, an impressive 49.6k are in
IP ranges of the hosters we identified—almost exclusively
Cloudflare (48.0k). The situation is similar in tk: of the
72k IPs, 53k are in the ranges of our hosters.
Ukrainian domains resolve to 33.7k IP addresses; how-
ever, only 12.1k lie in our hosting ranges. Cloudflare dom-
inates(9.4k), followed by DigitalOcean (≈ 900), OVH (≈
800), and Amazon (≈ 700). To better understand the
possible reasons for this high deployment, we inspect
under which second-level domain the DNS nameservers
of ua of domains that serve TLS 1.3 are operating. We
find that 19% are operated by PromDNS, a GoDaddy
subsidiary, and 51% by Inhosted, a hosting company
in Scotland. Together with Cloudflare, these providers
are responsible for the majority of TLS 1.3 in this TLD.
We find similar market concentration for sk, where 78%
of nameservers belong to the hosting company websup-
port.sk, and pl, where 67% belong to the domain hoster
nazwa.pl.
At the lower end of Table 3, we find a market concen-
tration for Cloudflare: 59% of nameservers belong to the
company in the case of Portugal (pt) and South Africa
6
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Table 2: Overview of TLS deployment across zones; percentages given in relation to resolvable domains, i.e., those
with an A record. Note that numbers do not add up to 100% as we do not include failed handshakes, e.g., due to
server problems.
# Alexa Top 1m (%) # com/net/org (%) # new gTLDs (%) # ccTLDs (%)
Resolved domains 940.5K (100%) 144.0M (100%) 17.5M (100%) 72.4M (100%)
. . . open port 443 836.0K (88.89%) 79.2M (55.01%) 6.8M (39.07%) 39.0M (53.90%)
. . . with TLS 1.3 174.3K (18.53%) 7.8M (5.38%) 1.3M (7.62%) 3.3M (4.54%)
. . . with TLS 1.2 613.0K (65.18% 54.7M (38.01%) 4.0M (22.99%) 27.2M (37.64%)
. . . with TLS 1.1 217 (0.02%) 6.8K (0.0%) 153 (0.0%) 11.4K (0.02%)
. . . with TLS 1.0 17.5K (1.86%) 2.0M (1.38%) 178.1K (1.02%) 1.5M (2.10%)
IP addresses 584.8K (100%) 10.8M (100%) 1.5M (100%) 4.4M (100%)
. . . open port 443 521.5K (89.17%) 5.1M (47.38) 779.0K (53.51%) 2.6M (58.86%)
. . . with TLS 1.3 101.1K (17.29%) 299.2K (2.76%) 100.3k (6.89%) 196.6K (4.43%)
. . . with TLS 1.2 394.3K (67.42%) 3.9M (36.4%) 578.9K (39.77%) 2.1M (46.87%)
. . . with TLS 1.1 197 (0.03%) 2.5K (0.02%) 113 (0.01%) 1.3K (0.03%)
. . . with TLS 1.0 14.8K (2.53%) 266.4K (2.46%) 16.7K (1.15%) 127.7K (2.88%)
Table 3: Deployment of TLS 1.3 across 54 ccTLDs. Percentages indicate fraction of all TLS connections. Note that rf
is our transliteration for xn–1ai, i.e., the Russian Federation.
1 cf 80.1% 11 au 17.7% 21 nz 11.8% 31 ir 9.0% 41 kz 6.4% 51 de 3.8%
2 tk 75.0% 12 ma 17.7% 22 ru 11.1% 32 rf 8.5% 42 cl 6.3% 52 za 3.3%
3 ua 42.3% 13 ro 15.9% 23 sg 11.1% 33 nl 8.2% 43 mx 5.7% 53 fr 3.2%
4 sk 40.0% 14 co 15.7% 24 ie 10.7% 34 cz 8.1% 44 rs 5.4% 54 jp 2.8%
5 pl 28.0% 15 la 14.3% 25 at 10.4% 35 pe 7.5% 45 ar 4.7%
6 dk 25.8% 16 il 14.3% 26 eu 10.2% 36 br 7.4% 46 be 4.7%
7 io 22.6% 17 cc 13.0% 27 tv 10.1% 37 in 6.8% 47 no 4.6%
8 me 22.4% 18 tr 12.5% 28 my 10.0% 38 es 6.7% 48 se 4.5%
9 us 21.8% 19 gr 12.1% 29 ca 9.5% 39 it 6.6% 49 hu 4.4%
10 cn 19.0% 20 su 11.9% 30 ch 9.4% 40 tw 6.5% 50 pt 4.1%
(za), and 60% in the case of France. In Germany, Cloud-
flare and 1blu dominate (30% and 28%, respectively).
Japan is different again: 56% come from the Japanese
hoster value-domain.com, and 19% from Cloudflare.
Caveat. It is important to note that our data does not
contain all name servers in the respective zones, but
only those for domains with TLS 1.3. As most domains
in cf and tk are hosted by Cloudflare, we can say with
confidence that Cloudflare is also the reason for the high
deployment of TLS 1.3. However, in most other cases,
our data does not allow us to identify conclusive reasons
for high or low TLS 1.3 deployment beyond our chosen,
large cloud providers.
5.1.6 Impact of hosting services. Table 4 provides an
overview of TLS 1.3 deployment across our chosen do-
main groups. On the Alexa list, the biggest player across
all zones and groups is Cloudflare: 13.5% of TLS-enabled
domains reside in their IP range, with Amazon (7.5%)
and Google (5.7%) following at some distance. However,
nearly 60% of all TLS 1.3-enabled domains are hosted
by Cloudflare, and both Google and Amazon have much
lower shares.
Cloudflare’s dominance also extends to gTLDs, where
more than 70% of TLS 1.3-enabled domains are in Cloud-
flare’s IP space. It is ‘just’ over 30% in com/net/org
and across the ccTLDs. Squarespace, interestingly, is
not strongly represented in most domain groups, except
com/net/org—showing that the company hosts many
smaller sites not on the Alexa list. Similarly, GoDaddy
generally has no TLS 1.3 deployment, but a number of
domains in com/net/org and the gTLDs host with them
have. Amazon does not have significant deployment of
TLS 1.3, enabled. The VPS provider, OVH, rarely shows
up with significant numbers, except for ccTLDs. OVHs
is reputedly a common choice among private customers
and smaller businesses who tend to host under their
country’s ccTLD.
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Table 4: Analysis of TLS-enabled domains with front-end by a major provider. Note that percentages are percentages
of domains with successful TLS 1.x and TLS 1.3 handshakes, respectively, not just resolvable domains. The special
case of Akamai is discussed in Section 4.1.
Alexa com/net/org gTLD ccTLD
% TLS 1.3 % TLS 1.x % TLS 1.3 % TLS 1.x % TLS 1.3 % TLS 1.x % TLS 1.3 % TLS 1.x
Cloudflare 59.8 (1) 13.5 (1) 35.4 (1) 4.8 (2) 70.6 (1) 17.3 (1) 32.7 (1) 3.4 (2)
Google 11.3 (2) 5.7 (3) 1.4 (3) 2.9 (6) 0.6 (5) 2.6 (5) 0.6 (5) 2.1 (5)
Squarespace 4.8 (3) 1.0 (8) 29.8 (2) 3.6 (4) 7.1 (2) 1.7 (6) 5.5 (2) 0.6 (6)
Amazon 0.8 (4) 7.5 (2) 0.6 (5) 4.3 (3) 0.7 (3) 7.6 (2) 0.5 (6) 3.3 (3)
OVH 0.7 (5) 3.8 (4) 1.0 (4) 3.5 (5) 0.7 (4) 3.9 (4) 1.0 (3) 5.8 (1)
DigitalOcean 0.6 (6) 1.7 (6) 0.5 (6) 0.9 (7) 0.3 (6) 1.3 (7) 0.6 (4) 0.6 (7)
Azure 0.1 (7) 1.3 (7) 0.0 (7) 0.4 (8) 0.0 (8) 0.3 (8) 0.0 (7) 0.3 (8)
Alibaba 0.0 (8) 0.1 (9) 0.0 (8) 0.1 (9) 0.0 (7) 0.3 (9) 0.0 (8) 0.0 (9)
GoDaddy 0.0 (9) 2.8 (5) 0 (9) 15.2 (1) 0 (9) 6.4 (3) 0.0 2.7 (4)
(Akamai) (0.0) (0.3%) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)
We analyze the use of TLS 1.3 on Alexa domains in
more detail. Previous analyzing the deployment of a new
security technology commonly showed more high-ranking
domains deploying the technology, especially if the new
mechanism had low risk to availability and little com-
plexity. This is true, e.g., for Certificate Transparency
and HSTS [9], but also for Certificate Authority Au-
thorization [57]. Our expectation is hence that TLS 1.3
is also deployed more commonly on high-ranking sites.
However, our data does not support this: deployment is
fairly consistent across the entire range. TLS 1.3 has a
fraction of 21.7% for the top 1M domains. For the top
1K, it is 21.9%; for the top 50K and 100K we find 27.3%
and 26.1%, i.e., a slight bump. For the top 500k, it falls
to 22.2% again.
We filter our results to investigate the contributions of
cloud providers in the case of TLS 1.3-enabled domains
in Table 5. Cloudflare is the dominant provider: of top
1M TLS 1.3-enabled domains, 59.8% are with Cloud-
flare. The percentage is even higher for domains in the
middle ranges of the Alexa list, reaching up to 82.9%.
Google is only relevant in the Top 1K, where its share of
TLS 1.3-enabled domains is 28.1%—although its market
share rises slightly at the lower end of the Alexa ranks.
Squarespace host 4.8% of all TLS 1.3 domains, but also
with a market share shifted towards the lower-ranking
domains. Amazon has a relatively meager share across
all ranks.
5.2 Use in research/education networks
In this section discuss results from the passive data
collections, using data from both the ICSI SSL Notary
as well as our collection effort in Australia.
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Figure 1: Negotiated TLS Versions since February 2012.
Figure 1 shows the versions of TLS that the ICSI
Notary saw being negotiated in our large-scale dataset
since February 2012. To not clutter the plot, we exclude
SSLv2 and SSLv3, which did not see significant use.
TLS was standardized in 2008. Yet, at the beginning
of the graph in 2012, the Notary saw basically zero use
of TLS 1.2. Much software did not support TLS 1.2 at
this point of time. For example, OpenSSL added support
for TLS 1.2 in version 1.0.1 (March 2012). The Notary
did not see more than 50% of connections use TLS 1.2
before mid-2014. In contrast, TLS 1.3 is already seeing a
significant amount of use. As of April of this year 4.6%
of connections negotiate some variant of TLS 1.3. This
is the case even though the RFC was only published in
August 2018. Figure 2 takes a look at client connections
offering TLS 1.3 in the notary data set. This gives an
even more extreme picture—as of April 2019, 39.8% of
clients advertise support for some variant of TLS 1.3.
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Table 5: TLS 1.3 deployment on Alexa domains. Percentages are given with respect to domains with successful
TLS 1.3 handshakes. We omit Azure, Alibaba, and GoDaddy due to very low numbers.
TLS 1.3 % Top 1K % Top 10K % Top 50K Top 100K % Top 500K % Top 1M
+ Cloudflare 57.1 79.6 82.9 82.2 70.6 59.8
+ Google 28.1 5.3 2.5 2.5 6.3 11.3
+ Squarespace 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.8 4.8
+ Amazon 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8
+ OVH 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7
+ DigitalOcean 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6
other setups 2.6 3.4 3.6 3.5 4.2 4.7
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Figure 2: Client connections offering TLS 1.3.
Comparing the Notary figures with our data collection
in Australia reveals that TLS 1.3 traffic is significantly
more commonly seen there; 9.6% of connections negotiate
a variant of TLS 1.3. This might be caused by different
usage-patterns, which we show below.
5.2.1 TLS 1.3 variants. With TLS 1.3, the way that the
TLS protocol version is negotiated changes significantly.
In TLS 1.2 and below, the client advertises the highest
version it supports in the version field of the client hello.
The server selects the final version and returned it in
the version field of the server hello.
TLS 1.3 originally wanted to keep this approach. How-
ever, trials showed that some servers did not react grace-
fully when exposed to version numbers greater than
1.2 [51]. Thus, with draft 16 of the TLS 1.3 RFC a
new approach was introduced. The client-hello always
sends a version field indicating TLS 1.2. A new supported
versions extension advertises a list of versions that the
client supports, hiding higher versions from non-TLS 1.3
servers.
Later, in draft 22, a similar approach was introduced
for the server-hello, after it was determined that middle-
boxes also have problems with the new TLS 1.3 server
hello (see [52]). Originally, TLS 1.3 wanted to introduce a
Table 6: Client-offered, and final negotiated TLS versions
in April 2019 at site 𝑁1.
Version Server Conn. Client Conn.
TLS 10 1.83% 33.33%
TLS 11 0.01% 32.54%
TLS 12 93.6% 84.69%
TLS 13 2.51% 34.4%
TLS 13-7E01 none < 0.01
TLS 13-7E02 none < 0.01
TLS 13-draft18 none 0.04%
TLS 13-draft23 0.01% 0.36%
TLS 13-draft26 < 0.01 0.01%
TLS 13-draft27 none < 0.01
TLS 13-draft28 < 0.01 0.02%
TLS 13-FB23 < 0.01 0.01%
TLS 13-FB26 2.05% 2.03%
new, shorter server hello. Instead, the final TLS 1.3 server
hello uses the exact same structure as the TLS 1.2 server
hello and puts TLS 1.2 into its version field. If TLS 1.3 is
negotiated, this version is put into the supported versions
extension, like on the client side.
This change of advertising specific versions, instead of
a maximum version, also allows the negotiation of alter-
native versions of TLS 1.3. The aforementioned number
of 4.6% negotiated TLS 1.3 connections is actually split
accross a number of different versions that are negotiated
using the supported versions extension.
Table 6 shows the server negotiated versions as well
as the client offered versions that we observed during
the month of April 2019. Note that for the client offered
versions we use all the values present in the supported
versions extension; since several values can be present,
the total can exceed 100%. If the supported versions
extension is not sent (pre-TLSv1.3 clients), the client
version hello is used.
The two TLS versions starting with FB are used exclu-
sively by Facebook services; the connections terminate
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at Facebook and Instagram servers. We assume that
these connections are mostly made by mobile apps. We
are not sure how these connections differ from the final
TLS 1.3 standard: for a passive observer besides the fact
that they use a different version number, they look like
typical TLS 1.3 connections.
We still see a few connections of two draft versions of
TLS 1.3 being negotiated (drafts 23, 26, and 28). These
connections terminate nearly exclusively at Facebook
servers; only a few draft 23 and draft 28 connections
terminate at other servers (e.g., gravatar, atdmt.com).
The 0x7E01 and 0x7E02 versions that were advertised
by some clients are experiments by Google Chrome to
test slight changes to handshake behavior. We assume
they are caused by old versions of Google Chrome still
in circulation; for the 0x7E01 case, we saw 3 connections
(terminating at gstatic.com); for the 0x7E02 case we
saw 16,548 connections to a mix of domains, including
Google, Facebook and a few smaller services.
Looking just at the clients that send the supported
versions extension also reveals that most clients also
signal support for older versions of TLS in the extension.
For clients sensing the extensions, 93.4% of connections
advertise support for TLS 1.0 in it, 93.4% for TLS 1.1
and 94.2% for TLS 1.2. We are not sure why this choice
was made; servers supporting the supported versions
extension will have to support at least TLS 1.2 and some
variant of TLS 1.3. While an argument can be made to
include TLS 1.2 in the list, there does not seem to be a
good reason to include even earlier versions.
The standardized TLS 1.3 is offered in 98.8% of con-
nections; the rest offers one of the other TLS 1.3 variants.
56.7% of connections also contain one of the GREASE
markers in the supported versions fields. GREASE is
a proposal by Google that introduces random numbers
to some field of the TLS handshake [15]. The goal is
to expose bugs in software that does not deal well with
unknown values (which should be ignored).
Looking at the evolution of TLS versions offered by
clients reveals that, especially at the beginning, there
were rapid changes. While in November 2016, virtually
all observed TLS 1.3 connections advertised draft 16, this
changed to all draft-18 by January 2018. Draft 18 in turn
nearly completely disappears in Februrary 2018 - till then
it was responsible for nearly 100% of TLS 1.3 connections.
Starting in 2018 the situation gets more complex with
several different drafts, as well as proprietary versions
of Google and Facebook beind present simultaneously.
Support for the final version of TLS 1.3 has been growing
quickly since October 2011.
5.2.2 Users of TLS 1.3. Similar to Sec. 5.1.6, we use IP
ranges to determine hosting providers and large services
that are commonly seen hosting TLS services. Table 7
compares the use of TLS 1.3 and earlier TLS versions of
different services with each other.
Our data shows a few striking differences. First, at the
moment an overwhelming fraction of TLS 1.3 connection
terminates at Facebook servers, while these only make
up a relatively small number of the IP addresses serving
TLS 1.3. In contrast, Cloudflare owns over 70% of the
IP addresses that we see serving TLS 1.3. The difference
to TLS 1.2 and earlier deployments is also large: while
more than 33% of the TLS 1.2 and earlier connections
terminate in Amazon IP space, only 0.42% of TLS 1.3
connections do so.
Comparing data with Australia reveals a few interest-
ing differences; in Australia traffic to Google and not
to Facebook dominates. Cloudflare is similar, not being
responsible for a lot of connections, but owning a large
amount of the TLS 1.3 IPs.
Both sites show that currently a small number of enti-
ties are driving TLS 1.3 deployment. Table 7 also shows
the striking difference of analyzing TLS connections by
number of IP addresses versus by number of connections,
which gives a completely different view of the ecosystem.
5.2.3 Cipher use in TLS 1.3. TLS 1.3 introduced cipher
suites that are different from earlier versions, currently
limited to just 5 different cipher suites. Looking at the
data in April 2019, we see 128-bit AES in GCM mode
dominating (79.2% of connections); we also see some
use of 256-bit AES in GCM mode (14.4%) as well as
of ChaCha20+Poly1305 (6.4%). We see no use of the
other 2 cipher suites (AES in CCM mode). Looking at
the different variants of TLS 1.3 does not change thie
result—128-bit AES in GCM mode is by far the most
popular everywhere.
Comparing with earlier versions of TLS reveals a simi-
lar picture. 128-bit AES in GCM mode with SHA256 and
ECDHE with an RSA or ECDSA key exchange is used in
64.6% of connections (51.9% using RSA and 12.7% using
ECDSA key exchange). Following this, we find 128-bit
AES in GCM mode with SHA256 and ECDHE with an
RSA or ECDSA key exchange in 21.5% of connections
(20.1% using RSA and 1.4% using ECDSA key exchange).
The next most popular algorithm is 256-bit AES with
SHA384 in CBC mode with an RSA key exchange in
2.8% of connections.
We did not find any cases where servers negotiated
TLS 1.2 cipher suites (which would break the specifica-
tion in several ways).
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Table 7: Percentage of connections and IP addresses speaking different TLS versions mapped to different providers.
Notary Site 𝑁1 Australian University
% Connections % IPs % Connections % IPs
TLS1.3 ≤ TLS1.2 TLS1.3 ≤ TLS1.2 TLS1.3 ≤ TLS1.2 TLS1.3 ≤ TLS1.2
Facebook 60.78 (1) 1.02 (7) 3.22 (4) 0.12 (10) 24.72 (2) 1.54 (6) 1.15 (5) 0.12 (11)
Cloudflare 9.66 (3) 1.39 (6) 70.45 (1) 4.86 (4) 5.79 (4) 1.04 (7) 64.17 (1) 4.44 (3)
Google 8.33 (4) 12.87 (3) 4.91 (3) 1.47 (5) 52.46 (1) 6.75 (4) 5.33 (3) 2.52 (5)
Amazon 0.42 (5) 33.64 (2) 2.32 (5) 68.02 (1) 0.25 (5) 31.23 (2) 2.2 (4) 44.18 (1)
Akamai 0.41 (6) 7.2 (5) 0.86 (6) 6.13 (3) 0.15 (6) 5.29 (5) 0.34 (8) 4 (4)
Digitalocean 0.05 (7) 0.16 (9) 0.65 (7) 0.69 (6) 0.01 (9) 0.11 (10) 0.5 (6) 1.16 (7)
Squarespace 0.04 (8) <0.01 (12) 0.01 (11) <0.01 (12) 0.03 (7) < 0.01 (12) 0.03 (11) < 0.01 (12)
Alibaba 0.02 (9) 0.04 (11) 0.04 (10) 0.04 (11) < 0.01 (12) 0.21 (8) 0.08 (9) 0.19 (10)
Ovh 0.02 (10) 0.2 (8) 0.24 (8) 0.43 (8) 0.02 (8) 0.18 (9) 0.4 (7) 0.94 (8)
Azure <0.01 (11) 8.88 (4) 0.07 (9) 0.45 (7) 0.01 (10) 15.07 (3) 0.05 (10) 1.21 (6)
Godaddy <0.01 (12) 0.06 (10) 0.01 (12) 0.37 (9) < 0.01 (11) 0.01 (11) 0.02 (12) 0.45 (9)
Others 20.26 (2) 34.54 (1) 17.2 (2) 17.42 (2) 16.56 (3) 38.58 (1) 25.74 (2) 40.78 (2)
5.2.4 Resumed connections & Early data. In April con-
nections of the ICSI Notary, 9.7% of TLS 1.3 connections
include the pre-shared key extension (Australia: 12.6%),
indicating that client can resume a connection with a
server.3 In 92% of cases (or 8.9% of total connections;
Australia: 96% or 12.1% of total), the server also replies
with a pre shared key extension which means that re-
sumption (or PSK use) succeeds.
Besides session-resumption, TLS 1.3 also introduces a
0-RTT mode in which a client can already send data in
the first TCP packet. The client must have connected
to the server at an earlier time and must try to resume
the connection with already pre-established key mate-
rial. The client can signal that it wants to send 0-RTT
data using the early data extension. This comes with cer-
tain drawbacks; using 0-RTT mode is vulnerable against
replay attacks, and applications must check for this.
6.8% of TLS 1.3 connections, or 70% of connections in
which a client tries session resumption send the early data
extension (Australia: 4.3% of total or 33%), signaling
that the client sent 0-RTT data. Using our passive data
we cannot tell in how many cases the use of early data
succeeds—the encryption is already active at the point
when a server signals if it did or did not accept the early
data.
Cloudflare published a blog post [47] in which they
introduce 0-RTT support for their infrastructure. They
estimate that around 40% of connections might use 0-
RTT in TLS 1.3 because about 40% of TLS 1.2 connec-
tions use resumption. These numbers are much larger
than what we currently observe in practice.
3Another potential use-case is that the client and server pre-
negotiated an pre-shared-key out of band. This use-case is unusual.
The faster handshake of TLS 1.3 relies on the client
already sending cryptographic information in the first
handshake packet. In some cases, the server will not
accept the chosen cryptographic parameters, prompting
clients to re-send a second client-hello using a hello retry
request. This happens in 4% of connections (Australia;
data not present in Notary collection).
5.2.5 Other protocol features. The TLS 1.3 connections
we observe also use new extensions that have, to a large
degree, not been observed in earlier work. 69.1% of April
TLS 1.3 connections show support for the certificate
compression extension, of which only an outdated draft
(authored by Google and Cloudflare employees) [3] exists.
13.0% of April TLS 1.3 connections advertise support
for the record size limit extension [59], which is intended
for resource-limited clients. In addition, 78.3% of April
TLS 1.3 connections support the signed certificate times-
tamp (SCT) extension. SCTs are used together with
the Certificate Transparency project [43, 57]. We also
encountered 6 connections in all of 2019 that advertised
support for the encrypted server name indication.
Another commonly used extension is application layer
next protocol negotiation. This extension is, for example,
used to negotiate HTTP/2. It is sent by the client in
96.1% of TLS 1.3 connections in April 2019. In 20.5%
of cases clients signal that they just support HTTP 1.1.
55.1% of connections signal support for HTTP 2 and
1.1. Surprisingly, four of these connections list HTTP 1.1
first, signaling that they prefer it over HTTP2. 3.8% of
connections just advertise support for HTTP 2; these
clients probably will still support HTTP 1.1 if the server
does not support the extension.The remaining 24.0%
of connections signal support for SPDY 3.1, 3.0 and
HTTP 1.1 (but not HTTP 2). On the server side, the
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extension is encrypted, so we cannot tell what TLS 1.3
servers select.
5.3 Use in the Android ecosystem
As of today, Android does not provide native TLS 1.3
support to Android apps. Only beta versions of Android
Q do so since March 2019 [1]. However, as Razaghpanah
et al. demonstrated [49], most Android apps use native
OS libraries with default configurations for their TLS
needs. This implies that only a very small fraction of
Android users running beta versions of Android Q, as
well as those users who have installed apps developed
by large companies like Google, Facebook, and Mozilla
can use TLS 1.3 in their handsets. In this section, we
use Lumen data to look at the deployment of TLS 1.3
in the Android ecosystem, both at the client- and at the
server-side.
5.3.1 Client-side vs. server-side support. The fraction of
Lumen-captured TLS 1.3 connections has gone up from
0.01% of all TLS connections in January of 2018 to 4% in
March 2019. However, TLS 1.3 support in Android apps
is lagging behind TLS 1.2 support which still accounts
for 94.9% of observed TLS connections in March 2019.
Examining TLS 1.3 deployment and support on a
per-application basis, shows interesting dynamics and
clearly identifies the main actors driving this effort. Fig-
ure 3 shows how Android app support for TLS 1.3 has
evolved over time compared to server-side support. A
server is marked as supporting TLS 1.3 when it either
negotiated a TLS 1.3 connection, or when it set the ap-
propriate downgrade marker indicating TLS 1.3 support.
The figure demonstrates how client-support lags behind
server-side for Android apps. The sharp increase for app
support of TLS 1.3 is partially caused by early users of
the Android Q beta (March 2019).
Prior to the release of this beta, apps that advertise
support for TLS 1.3 do so using their own TLS framework
or external open-source TLS libraries like Facebook’s
Fizz [30], or OpenSSL 1.1. Specifically, Lumen data
shows that beyond major Android browsers known to
support TLS 1.3 —e.g., beta versions of Chromium
and Firefox and other browsers based on them, which
are not present in Lumen’s dataset to preserve users’
anonymity—, only a handful of apps supported TLS 1.3
before it became standardized. The Facebook family
of apps have implemented draft versions of TLS 1.3
since early 2017, replacing the implementaions of older
drafts with new ones as they were being proposed for
standardization. This indicates that, due to the absence
of native OS support, early TLS 1.3 support in Android
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Figure 3: Percentage of mobile apps and servers offering
TLS 1.3.
has been limited to apps developed by companies with
large development teams.
The TLS 1.3 draft versions that have experienced the
most dramatic increases and subsequent decreases in
use are the ones deployed by companies like Facebook
and Google. These companies have a privileged position
thanks to their control over both the client- and the
server-side. For instance, Facebook’s TLS 1.3 custom
draft version 23 sees a sharp decline in the Spring of 2018,
going down from 49% of all negotiated TLS 1.3 versions
in April of 2018, to 0.1% the next month, replaced by
Facebook’s custom draft version 26, which accounted for
47% of all negotiated TLS 1.3 versions in May of 2018.
We stress, however, that Facebook’s family of apps do
not advertise Facebook’s custom versions of TLS 1.3 as
the one with the highest priority in the supported ver-
sions extension. We speculate that this is done to avoid
breaking TLS 1.3 servers that don’t support Facebook’s
own versions of TLS 1.3. The final TLS 1.3 standard
has been rapidly adopted by those Android apps that
had previosly supported drafts of the protocol. This is
evident by examining both advertised and negotiated
versions. However, given application developers’ reliance
of platform-provided TLS libraries, it seems unlikely that
we will observe a massive support of TLS 1.3 in Android
applications until Android Q is officially released in the
second-half of 2019.
6 DISCUSSION
The adoption of TLS 1.3 seems to be happening much
faster than ever before for a new TLS version. Growing
awareness of security and privacy may play some role,
but our findings identify a different primary reason: a
small set of cloud providers host a large number of
domains and is able to activate the new protocol on
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their behalf. This corresponds with early support in
mainstream browsers, at least outside of the mobile world.
Our data is quite consistent in this regard: although
deployment among DNS zones vary quite dramatically,
when TLS 1.3 is supported, it is most commonly because
of Google, Facebook, and Cloudflare.
Facebook is a particularly interesting case as they
deployed Facebook-specific versions and experimented
with them. Control of both endpoints—an app on the
mobile device, and the Facebook server farms—are the
necessary ingredients here. A similar statement can be
made about Google, who control the Chrome browser
and a number of the most popular Internet services,
and who have contributed to the protocol development
and detected the problematic cases of malfunctioning
middleboxes.
Cloudflare is the front-end provider responsible for
most TLS 1.3 handshakes in our active scans—for Alexa
domains, Cloudflare accounts for 60% of TLS 1.3-enabled
domains. Smaller hosters complement this picture, like
Squarespace with their respectable share of Alexa do-
mains and ccTLD domains. We have found evidence
that, in some countries, similar providers have the same
role.
On the face of it, one could thus speak of a net benefit
for consumers. However, our data also shows that up-
take of the new protocol version is remarkably different
outside the ecosystem of the companies that drove the
development of TLS 1.3—as in com/net/org and most
ccTLDs, especially the important zones de and fr , which
have a very low adoption rate. While the big providers
profit from their ability to test-drive new protocols in
many variants, providers like Amazon or Azure control
only one endpoint and have a competitive disadvantage
when developing a roll-out strategy. In the history of
TLS, this is an unprecedented situation. In our view, the
question will be whether the current market concentra-
tion of TLS 1.3 will attract more customers to the big
providers—to their Web services and clients alike—or
whether the playing field will be level eventually. We note
that similar questions surround other network protocols
like QUIC.
TLS 1.3 has a strong, positive impact on privacy. While
the server name is not (yet) encrypted, nearly everything
else of importance is. This makes it difficult to deploy
passive measurements to understand issues with new
protocols. Compared to previous studies on TLS 1.2,
we were already able to gather less data about TLS 1.3
details. Active scans can help to some degree, but they
have an impact on the Internet’s server population and
they are not a good method to test the many varieties
of TLS 1.3 and future protocols that may be test-driven
in the field before standardization. In fact, the afore-
mentioned providers are once again in the best position
to understand the development of new security proto-
cols. Although they seem keen at this stage to share
their insights with the research and development com-
munity, this may collide with business interests at some
points. It seems worthwhile to think about methods of
collaboration to develop new protocols.
One interesting lesson from the deployment of TLS 1.3
is the difficulty of introducing this new version—even
though TLS had version numbers, middleboxes and
server software did not cope well with higher version
numbers, triggering several protocol redesigns. Google
tries to prevent this from happening again by introduc-
ing random numbers to a lot of handshake elements (like
the supported version extension) - it will be interesting
to see if this approach succeeds.
7 REPRODUCIBLE RESEARCH
We wish to support other researchers repeating, replicat-
ing, or reproducing our measurements. We publish all
tools used in the preparation and execution of our active
scans and the code for each analysis step. We will release
our data of active scans in both raw (PCAP traces) and
processed format (CSV). We cannot release data from
passive monitoring or Lumen collection for ethical and
legal reasons.
8 CONCLUSION
We presented a first study of deployment and use of
TLS 1.3, including use in mobile applications. Our key
finding is that TLS 1.3 has considerable deployment
already. However, this is linked to strong market con-
centration: very few providers like Cloudflare control a
large number of domains and roll out the new proto-
col. Deployment elsewhere is strongly lagging behind.
In the mobile ecosystem, Google and Facebook are the
dominant users. In our passively obtained data, we also
observe that TLS 1.3 is mostly used in connections that
terminate at servers of these two companies, highlighting
their importance for consumers.
We will monitor how TLS 1.3 deployment will change
in the future with the adoption of OpenSSL 1.1 in more
Linux distributions. This will also give us a chance to
measure the update patterns of a large part of the user-
visible Internet.
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A ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our study involves the passive collection of network
traffic from real users and active network scans. We
follow the principles of informed consent [25] and best
practices [48]: we avoid the collection of any personal
or sensitive data, such as client IP addresses or traffic
payloads, and we try to avoid causing any harm to online
servers during our active scans. Below we discuss details
specific to each tool.
A.1 Passive Data collection
The passive data collection effort performed by the ICSI
SSL Notary was cleared by the respective responsible
parties at each contributing institution before they began
contributing. Note that the ICSI SSL Notary specifically
excludes or anonymizes sensitive information, such as
client IP addresses. In more detail, client IP addresses
are combined with the server IP address and SNI as well
as a site-specific, secret, hash unknown to ICSI. The
resulting string is hashed. This allows the dection of
when the same client connected to the same IP address
(e.g., to evaluate the effectiveness of session resumption),
without enabling the tracking of a client while it accesses
different servers. It also means that ICSI data does not
contain any information of how many users are active
at a specific site. While the Notary records server-sent
certificates the notary does not record client-certificates
if they are present in the handshake. The Notary only
records handshake information that is sent in the clear.
Passive data collection at the Australian hosting in-
stitution was reviewed and approved by the responsible
Human Ethics board. The data collection follows the
same anonymization principles as the ICSI Notary.
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A.2 Active Scans
We took precautions to minimize the impact of our scans,
following established practices as, for instance, described
in [28]. In particular, we maintain a blacklist to avoid
scanning systems that have in the past indicated to
us that they do not wish to be scanned. Our abuse
email address is published in the WHOIS and all abuse
emails are forwarded to us by our IT department. We
received one abuse email sent by a blocklist provider;
our scanner was whitelisted when we explained our work.
Our scanning activity was also reviewed by the Human
Ethics board of our hosting institution; it was found
that we do not collect personally identifiable information
and hence need not undergo a Human Ethics approval
process. We assess the impact of our scans in terms of
potential harm to other systems and human beings, as
proposed by the Menlo report [25]. We use a relatively
low scanning rate to minimize any impact and respond
immediately to complaints.
A.3 Lumen Privacy Monitor
Lumen’s view of real-world mobile data collected from
end-user devices raises ethical issues. We address these
in two ways:
Informed Consent. Lumen follows the principles of in-
formed consent as indicated by the Menlo Report [25]
and avoids the collection of any personal or sensitive data.
Users must explicitly grant permission to Lumen to in-
spect the traffic and the app requires users to opt-in a sec-
ond time to install a CA certificate to inspect encrypted
traffic. Furthermore, the user can disable traffic intercep-
tion and uninstall the app at any time. The privacy policy
of the app is available in Google Play as well as in the
project’s website: https://haystack.mobi/privacy.html.
Data Collection Strategy. Lumen runs on the user’s
device. It allows Lumen to confine the bulk of the data
processing to the device itself. Lumen only collects and
uploads to the project servers’ anonymized summary
statistics. Mobile app traffic flows are mapped to the
app generating them, and not to a user identity. For
example, we collect flow metadata like TLS Client Hello
and Server Hello records, HTTP User Agent Field, byte
counts, the destination IP address and the remote TCP
port number, the package name and version of the app
making the connection, and the OS version of Android
running on the device.
The data is uploaded following reasonable security
mechanisms (i.e., use of encryption). To further protect
user privacy, Lumen also ignores flows generated by ap-
plications which may potentially deanonymize a user. Ex-
amples of such applications are mobile browsers such as
the Android default browser or Google Chrome. The type
of traffic generated by these apps is highly dependent of
user actions, which not only makes deanonymizing users
easier, but also beats our purpose of understanding the
way that mobile apps work due to developer decisions.
The team behind Lumen follows ethical protocols, which
were developed in consultation with their Institutional
Review Board (IRB) —it is considered as a non-human
subject research effort due to the anonimization process—
before starting any data collection.
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